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INTRODUCTION 
In King v. Burwell,1 the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision, upholding regulations that extend the Premium Tax 
Credit (the Credit) to qualifying taxpayers who purchase health insurance on 
the Internet-based “Marketplace” operated by the federal Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), despite statutory language extending the 
subsidy to individuals who purchase through “an Exchange established by 
the State.”2  This was the second time in just three years that the Roberts 
Court engaged in what one critic called “linguistic acrobatics”3 that rescued 
President Obama’s signature healthcare law, the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA)4—or, as Justice Scalia derisively called it, “SCOTUScare”5—from 
attacks that would have gutted its core provisions.6 
 
 *  William W. Oliver Professor of Tax Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. 
 **  J.D. 2015, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. 
  The authors are grateful to Fred Aman for helpful comments on a prior draft. 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 2. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 3. See Chris Mondics, Roberts’ ACA Ruling Reveals Conservative Thinking, PHILLY.COM (June 
27, 2015), http://articles.philly.com/2015-06-27/news/63865425_1_justice-roberts-commerce-
clause-conservatives. 
 4. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 5. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2507 (“This Court . . . rewrites the law to make tax credits available 
everywhere.  We should start calling this law SCOTUScare.”). 
 6. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), the 
Court upheld the shared responsibility payment provision of the ACA’s individual mandate as a 
constitutionally permissible tax, even though “Congress took pains to label it a penalty and not a 
tax.”  Kevin Sack, Arguing That Health Mandate Is Not a Tax, Except When It Is, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/health/policy/arguing-that-health-mandate-is-not-a-
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While the King Court could have achieved the same result by deferring 
to Treasury’s interpretation in the regulation the plaintiffs were challenging,7 
it elected not to defer.  Instead, the Court rejected the application of 
Chevron8 and, declaring King an “extraordinary case[],” conducted its own 
interpretation of the ACA.  Thus, the Court reached a pro-government result 
without deferring to an agency rule. 
After King, scholars and lower courts may find themselves struggling 
with the contrast between decisions that seem to expand agency power9 and 
those that find Chevron inapplicable.  Accordingly, this Essay analyzes what 
King suggests about the future of Chevron deference.  Part I considers the 
King majority’s treatment of Chevron. Part II examines the effect of the 
Court’s lack of deference in King.  The Essay concludes that although King 
was an “extraordinary case” for the Court, Chevron’s heyday may be on the 
wane. 
I. THE KING COURT’S TREATMENT OF CHEVRON 
In King, four plaintiffs sued the Secretaries of HHS and Treasury, as 
well as the acting Commissioner of the IRS, because they did not wish to 
comply with the ACA’s individual mandate.10  The plaintiffs, residents of 
Virginia, lacked access to employer- or government-sponsored insurance, so 
their alternative was to purchase a plan on Virginia’s federally facilitated 
Exchange.11  Although plaintiffs’ incomes (absent any subsidy) would have 
 
tax-except-when-it-is.html. 
 7. Throughout this Essay, we refer to the rule at issue as a Treasury regulation—because that is 
what it is, despite the fact that the Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit, and Eastern District of Virginia 
each referred to it as an “IRS Rule.”  See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487; King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 
364 (4th Cir. 2014); King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415, 418 (E.D. Va. 2014).  The regulation 
was published in the Federal Register, Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377-
01 (May 23, 2012), and subsequently codified in title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Treas. 
Reg. § 1.36B-2 (2014).  It is worth noting that the plaintiffs used the “IRS Rule” terminology in their 
complaint. See Complaint at 1, King, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415 (No. 3:13-CV-630-JRS).  By contrast, the 
defendant agencies, in their responsive motions, consistently described the subject matter of the suit 
as a Treasury regulation.  See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction at 11, King, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415 (No. 3:13-CV-630-JRS); Defendants’ 
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Their Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion at 13, King, 997 F. 
Supp. 2d 415 (No. 3:13-CV-630-JRS). 
 8. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 9. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (holding that courts must defer 
under Chevron to agency interpretations with respect to ambiguities that concern the scope of their 
jurisdiction); Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011) 
(extending Chevron deference to Treasury regulations); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) 
(granting deference to agency’s interpretation of its own regulation). 
 10. King, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 420–21. 
 11. Id.  Virginia is one of thirty-four states that elected not to create their own Exchanges, 
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been low enough to qualify them for an exemption from the individual 
mandate, they were each deemed eligible for the Credit.12  As a result, they 
came within the ambit of the mandate, and they were required to either 
purchase insurance or remit a “shared responsibility payment.”13 
Plaintiffs contended that the regulation extending the Credit to federal 
Exchange purchasers, Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2,14  was incompatible with the 
unambiguous language of I.R.C. § 36B (Section 36B) and its companion 
provisions and thus exceeded Treasury’s authority.15 The district court and 
the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the government, deferring to Treasury’s 
interpretation under the traditional Chevron formulation.16 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a 6–3 decision, found the 
Credit available to purchasers on the federal Marketplace.17 After reciting 
the issue, the Court stated: 
 When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we often 
apply the two-step framework announced in Chevron.  Under that 
framework, we ask whether the statute is ambiguous and, if so, 
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.  This approach “is 
premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an 
implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the 
statutory gaps.  In extraordinary cases, however, there may be 
reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended 
 
triggering the provision of the ACA that empowers HHS to establish a federal Exchange, i.e., the 
Marketplace at HealthCare.gov. See State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2015, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/ (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
 12. King, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 420–21. 
 13. I.R.C. § 5000A(b) (2012). 
 14. Treasury regulation § 1.36B-2(a) (2014) parrots the ACA’s grant of a subsidy for taxpayers 
who enroll in plans via an Exchange.  See I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(a) (2012).  But § 1.36B-1(k), the 
regulation’s definitions provision, states that “Exchange” has the same meaning as in 45 C.F.R. § 
155.20 (2014), an HHS regulation.  That regulation provides that “Exchange” includes insurance 
markets for qualified individuals “regardless of whether the Exchange is established and operated by 
a State . . . or by HHS.”  
 15. King, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 428.  Section 36B(b)(2)(A) authorizes the Credit for taxpayers who 
purchase plans “through an Exchange established by the State under [section] 1311 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act.”  ACA section 1311—now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031—in 
turn provides that an Exchange “shall make available qualified health plans to qualified individuals.”  
42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(2)(A) (2012).  A “qualified individual” is someone “seeking to enroll in a 
qualified health plan in the individual market offered through the Exchange” and, importantly, 
“resides in the State that established the Exchange.”  Id. § 18032(f)(1)(A).  That language seems to 
suggest that the Credit authorized by Section 36B is limited to consumers who purchase insurance 
products on a state Exchange.  Obviously, the regulatory provisions discussed in supra note 14 are 
incompatible with that reading—hence the dispute in King. 
 16.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015). 
 17. Id. at 2496. 
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such an implicit delegation.” 
 This is one of those cases.18 
Thus, in just a few sentences, the majority dispensed with Chevron. 
The Court then explained why King was a case in which Congress may 
not have intended an implicit delegation: 
The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving billions 
of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of health 
insurance for millions of people.  Whether those credits are 
available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep 
“economic and political significance” that is central to this statutory 
scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, 
it surely would have done so expressly.19 
Oddly, the Court did not address an apparent express delegation to 
Treasury in the Internal Revenue Code section it was interpreting, Section 
36B: “The Secretary [of the Treasury] shall prescribe such regulations as 
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section . . . .”20  The 
Court may have had concerns about whether the delegation encompassed the 
regulation in question, but it didn’t say so.  Its silence regarding the 
delegation is particularly puzzling given that the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in 
the case stated that that language “clearly gives to the IRS authority to 
resolve ambiguities in 26 U.S.C. § 36B.”21 
The Supreme Court majority also stated that it was “especially unlikely 
that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no 
expertise in crafting health insurance policy.”22  However, the inclusive 
definition of “Exchange” is actually an HHS definition that Treasury cross-
references.23  Presumably, HHS does have the requisite expertise to regulate 
 
 18. Id. at 2488–89 (citations omitted) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). 
 19. Id. at 2489 (emphasis added) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 
2444 (2014)). 
 20. I.R.C. § 36B(g) (2012).  Other commentators have made this point, too.  See Syd Gernstein, 
King v. Burwell: A Win for the President, but a Loss for the IRS?, FED. TAX BLOG (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.bna.com/king-burwell-win-b17179928783/; Andy Grewal, Brown & Williamson vs. 
Congressional Intent, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 30, 2015), 
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/brown-williamson-vs-congressional-intent-by-andy-grewal. 
 21. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 375 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 22. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 23. See supra note 14.  The regulatory narrative is murky, however.  According to a Report by 
the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Treasury requested that HHS produce 
the definition that Treasury then cross-referenced.  See DARRELL ISSA & DAVE CAMP, H. COMM. ON 
OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, ADMINISTRATION CONDUCTED 
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in this area.  Yet, because the majority found that this was an extraordinary 
case, and “not a case for the IRS,”24 it concluded that the Court itself was 
tasked with interpreting Section 36B. 
The majority then reached the same result that the lower courts—and 
Treasury—had reached.25  However, finding the phrase “Exchange 
established by the State” ambiguous, the majority looked beyond the text of 
Section 36B to the ACA’s broader structure.26  It then interpreted the ACA 
in a manner consistent with what it found was Congress’s intent—i.e., “to 
improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them.”27  The fact that the 
Court’s failure to accord Chevron deference was unnecessary to the result in 
the case may say something about the future of Chevron: the deference 
doctrine may not be as bedrock as it once seemed. 
II. WHY DIDN’T THE KING COURT DEFER? 
At first blush, it could seem that the Court did not accord deference to 
the regulations because they were tax regulations.  That interpretation would 
be consistent with the Court’s observation that the IRS has no health-policy 
expertise.28  But, as discussed above, the regulatory definition in question is 
 
INADEQUATE REVIEW OF KEY ISSUES PRIOR TO EXPANDING HEALTH LAW’S TAXES AND SUBSIDIES 
18 (2014), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/IRS-Rule-OGR-WM-Staff-
Report-Final1.pdf (“IRS employees . . . sent an email to several HHS officials, . . . asking that HHS 
remedy the problem by deeming HHS exchanges to be exchanges established by states in HHS’s 
exchange regulation.”).  The Report does not describe how HHS developed its definition but quotes 
HHS’s proposed regulation’s explanation that “[t]he definition for an ‘Exchange’ . . . is drawn from 
the statutory text.”  Id. (quoting Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 41,866, 41,868 (July 15, 2011)).  
  In its final regulation, HHS reported having received just two comments on its definition of 
Exchange, but they addressed “whether the term ‘Exchange’ includes both the individual market and 
SHOP components of an Exchange,” not whether the definition includes HHS-established 
Exchanges. Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for 
Employers, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,314 (Mar. 27, 2012). 
 24. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 25. The majority found that it was “implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate” in the 
dysfunctional manner that plaintiff-petitioners proposed.  Id. at 2494.  “Had Congress meant to limit 
tax credits to State Exchanges,” the majority concluded, “it likely would have done so in . . . some . . 
. prominent matter.  It would not have used such a winding path of connect-the-dots provisions about 
the amount of the credit.”  Id. at 2495.  
 26. Id. at 2491–92.  
 27. Id. at 2496.  The Court took a similar approach in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), stating, “In determining whether Congress has specifically addressed 
the question at issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory 
provision in isolation.”  Id. at 132.  This approach is reminiscent of the “purposive” approach Judge 
Learned Hand applied in cases such as Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 
U.S. 465 (1935).  See Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A 
Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 718. 
 28. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
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actually an HHS definition that Treasury cross-references.29  Moreover, just 
four years earlier, the Court announced—in another opinion written by the 
Chief Justice—that in the absence of justification, it was “not inclined to 
carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only.”30 
Furthermore, the Court’s statement that it was unlikely that Congress 
would have delegated this issue to the IRS was the Court’s second stated 
reason not to defer.  The majority first stated, “Whether those credits are 
available on Federal Exchanges is . . . a question of deep ‘economic and 
political significance’ that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress 
wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so 
expressly.”31  So, it seems clear that King was about more than which agency 
interpreted the statute. 
Though the King Court’s departure from Chevron was atypical, it was 
not unprecedented.  In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the 
Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s decision invalidating FDA regulations 
governing tobacco marketing on the ground that Congress had not delegated 
authority to the FDA to regulate in this area.32  As a result, the FDA’s efforts 
to restrict cigarette advertising were temporarily stymied, a development 
welcomed by the tobacco industry.33  Writing for the Court, Justice 
O’Connor explained that while “agencies are generally entitled to deference 
in the interpretation of statutes that they administer,” in that case, Congress 
“clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco 
products.”34  Such jurisdiction was “inconsistent with the intent that 
Congress . . . expressed in the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s (FDCA)] 
overall regulatory scheme and in the tobacco-specific legislation that it . . . 
enacted subsequent to the FDCA.”35 
 
 29. See supra note 14; text accompanying note 23.  
 30. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011) (Roberts, 
C.J., for the Court) (“The principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full force in the 
tax context.”). 
 31. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444, 
(2014)). 
 32. 529 U.S. 120. 
 33. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Holds F.D.A. Can’t Impose Rules on Tobacco, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/22/us/high-court-holds-fda-can-t-impose-
rules-on-tobacco.html.  
 34. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 125–26. 
 35. Id. at 126.  The Chevron case stated that a court reviewing an agency determination “is 
confronted with two questions.”  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842 (1984).  In the pre-Mead case of Brown & Williamson, before the idea of “Chevron Step 
Zero” had taken hold, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (coining that term), the majority purported to situate its analysis within Chevron 
Step One.  However, the Court’s decision in Brown & Williamson—finding that the FDA lacked 
jurisdiction altogether with respect to tobacco—is quite different from the ordinary Step One case, 
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The Brown & Williamson Court articulated an exception to Chevron that 
precluded deference: 
Deference under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a statute that it 
administers is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes 
an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory 
gaps.  In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate 
before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.36 
The majority found that Brown & Williamson was “hardly an ordinary 
case,” given the importance of the tobacco industry in the American 
economy, the FDA’s history of restraint in this area, and the distinct 
regulatory scheme Congress had established for tobacco products.37 
Six years later, in Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court again declined 
deference to an agency interpretation.38  In Gonzales, the Court reviewed an 
interpretive rule promulgated by the U.S. Attorney General, purporting to 
include drugs used for physician-assisted suicide among those substances 
subject to the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA).39  The Court found 
that the rule was not entitled to Chevron deference because Congress, 
through the CSA, had granted the Attorney General only the power to 
promulgate rules relating to registration and control of substance dispensing, 
not the power to denounce state-authorized medical standards.40  The Court 
acknowledged that the CSA included ambiguous language susceptible to 
varying constructions.41  But as the Court explained, “Chevron deference . . . 
is not accorded merely because the statute is ambiguous and an 
administrative official is involved. To begin with, the rule must be 
promulgated pursuant to authority Congress has delegated to the official.”42  
The Attorney General claimed “extraordinary authority,”43 so his 
interpretation was not entitled to deference. 
Perhaps King is simply of a piece with Brown & Williamson and 
Gonzales, the (relatively) rare case in which an agency acts without 
congressionally delegated authority: no delegation, no deference.  But 
 
where the Court determines whether a particular agency interpretation is consistent with Congress’s 
unambiguous intent. 
 36. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. 
 37. Id. at 159–60; see also 7 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000) (repealed 2004) (“The marketing of 
tobacco constitutes one of the greatest basic industries of the United States with ramifying activities 
which directly affect interstate and foreign commerce at every point, and stable conditions therein 
are necessary to the general welfare.”). 
 38. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 39. Id. at 258, 275. 
 40. Id. at 257–58. 
 41. Id. at 258. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 262. 
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according to the Court, in Brown & Williamson, the FDA had no authority 
to regulate tobacco marketing, period;44 in Gonzales, the Attorney General 
had no authority to invalidate state-authorized medical treatments, full 
stop.45  By contrast, Treasury and the IRS presumably have substantial 
authority under the ACA to administer the Credit.46  King is not a tale of an 
agency acting ultra vires, at least not in the traditional sense.  So while King 
may be an “extraordinary case,” it is worth taking a step back to look at the 
larger context. 
First, the Justices do not all agree on the scope of Chevron’s domain.  
The Chief Justice has expressed concern about agency aggrandizement 
under Chevron.  For instance, he dissented vigorously from Justice Scalia’s 
holding in City of Arlington v. FCC that agency interpretations concerning 
the scope of their own jurisdiction are entitled to deference.47  Joined by 
Justices Kennedy and Alito, Roberts described his disagreement with the 
majority as “fundamental” and “easily expressed: A court should not defer to 
an agency until the court decides, on its own, that the agency is entitled to 
deference.”48 
By contrast, Justice Scalia ordinarily is a strong advocate for Chevron 
deference.49  Writing for the City of Arlington majority, he characterized the 
Chief Justice’s dissent as proposing “a massive revision of our Chevron 
jurisprudence,” writing that no case has ever held that “a general conferral of 
rulemaking or adjudicative authority [is] . . . insufficient to support Chevron 
deference for an exercise of that authority within the agency’s substantive 
field.”50 
Perhaps King is the next stage of Chief Justice Roberts’s “massive 
revision” of Chevron.  However, it is worth noting that Justice Scalia did not 
argue that Chevron analysis applied in King, even to deny deference at Step 
One.  His argument focused instead on statutory interpretation: “Under all 
 
 44. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 45. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 46. See I.R.C. § 36B(g) (2012) (“The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out the provisions of this section . . . .”). 
 47. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874–75 (2013). 
 48. Id. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Roberts may not be the only Justice with 
reservations about Chevron.  At oral argument in King, Justice Kennedy mused that while statutory 
ambiguity would normally prompt deference, “it seems . . . a drastic step . . . to say that the 
Department of Internal Revenue and its director [sic] can make this call one way or the other when 
there are, what, billions of dollars of subsidies involved here?”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 74, 
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114). 
 49. See, e.g., City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (Scalia, J., for the majority); United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 50. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874. 
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the usual rules of interpretation . . . the Government should lose this case.”51  
King seems therefore to be more than a mere pawn in a general dispute 
among the Justices about the breadth of the Chevron doctrine. 
King should also be considered in light of National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, a case addressing 
agency reinterpretations.52  Had the King Court invoked Chevron to rule for 
the government, Treasury—perhaps prompted by a future Administration—
would have been free to revise the regulation in question to limit the Credit 
to purchasers on State exchanges.53  Presumably such a revision would have 
been entitled to deference.54  In Brand X, the Court stated that “[o]nly a 
judicial precedent holding that [a] statute unambiguously forecloses the 
agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, 
displaces a conflicting agency construction.”55  King adds a wrinkle to Brand 
X, because the King Court found that Section 36B was ambiguous.56  But the 
effect of the King Court’s rejection of the ordinary Chevron framework is to 
foreclose the agency reinterpretation that Brand X allows.  Ultimately, the 
King analysis threads a very narrow needle: because the statute is 
ambiguous, its reference to State Exchanges need not be interpreted literally, 
yet because Chevron does not apply, agency interpretations that conflict with 
the Court’s interpretation of the statute are precluded. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The King majority’s analysis is initially puzzling because the Court 
could have reached the same pro-ACA result by simply applying Chevron.  
Moreover, it seems odd that the Court based its analysis on a doctrine 
(derived from Brown & Williamson) that frees courts from assuming implicit 
congressional delegations when, in fact, the statute contains an apparent 
explicit delegation. 
Ultimately, King may not be just extraordinary but sui generis, a 
“wrecking ball” case that could have destabilized an important social 
program had the Court reached a different result.  But King may also suggest 
 
 51. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 52. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 53. Gernstein, supra note 20. 
 54. See id. (noting that, during oral argument in King, Chief Justice Roberts asked about the 
possibility of agency reinterpretation); cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–
15 (2009) (recognizing that an agency may implement a policy change so long as the “new policy is 
permissible under the statute, . . . there are good reasons for it, and . . . the agency believes it to be 
better” (emphasis omitted)). 
 55. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982–83. 
 56. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015). 
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that our one-time expectations regarding judicial deference to agency 
interpretations may require reevaluation.  Chief Justice Roberts’s “massive 
revision” to Chevron, decried by Justice Scalia in City of Arlington,57 may be 
gaining traction.  It will be interesting to see how the doctrine evolves in the 
coming Terms. 
 
 
 57. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
